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Ohio’s school finance history can be characterized as progressive. 
Early state funding for school libraries was apportioned from state 
property tax receipts and distributed to local schools on a per-pupil 
basis. When equalization funding was invented to help poorer 
school systems, Ohio adopted that model of funding. Later, when 
policymakers placed greater emphasis on teaching, Ohio distributed 
state funds based on teacher units. Throughout the 1990s, Ohio 
grappled with the elusive concept of adequacy of school funding. 
The new millennium ushered in an era of data collection, evalua-
tion, and assessment.
While the aforementioned educational progressions were evolv-
ing, the economy was demonstrating its cyclical nature. Tax receipts 
increased during economic expansions, and tax receipts decreased 
during economic contractions. Optimism for school funding ensued 
during expansions, and demands for increased productivity were 
characterized during contractions. Although this pattern of opti-
mism and demand for productivity has been difficult to empirically 
address, we can learn much about schooling by studying this ten-
sion in political economy.
Superintendents and other school administrators live with 
tensions in political economy. The voting public believes school 
funding is fixed when the economy expands and new state pro-
grams are introduced. Administrators are publicly criticized when, 
strained for resources, their schools cannot perform within the “do 
more with less” paradigm. This research begins to trace patterns 
of political economy in schooling. I emphasize the last economic 
recession along with funding for schools to describe challenges for 
school administrators. I also emphasize entrepreneurial movements 
in schooling to describe competition that public school administra-
tors face. A jaundiced viewpoint asserts that public school funding 
suffers entropy while entrepreneurial school funding expands.
Scott Sweetland is Associate Professor in the School of Edu-
cational Policy and Leadership at The Ohio State University. 
He holds an M.B.A. from St. Bonaventure University and a 
Ph.D. from SUNY Buffalo. His areas of research and teaching 
include school business administration and school finance. 
Litigation Background
The most controversial and definitive Ohio school finance reform 
judicial decisions began and ended with DeRolph v. State (1997, 
2003). Although relevant court decisions occurred before 1997, just 
as others will occur afterward, these two-of-five DeRolph decisions 
encompassed the spirit, intent, and outcomes of school finance 
reform litigation in Ohio.
The 1997 DeRolph decision declared Ohio's school funding 
system unconstitutional. Fundamentally, the Ohio constitution was 
interpreted to mandate a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools throughout the state. After elaborate presentations of evi-
dence by both plaintiffs and defendants, in addition to diverse delib-
erations among Ohio Supreme Court justices, Ohio's school funding 
system failed; that is, the system was found to fail tests of being 
thorough and efficient. Underlying this judgmental test of thorough-
ness and efficiency, the following rationales were expressed:
(1) A "thorough" system is not starved for funds.
(2) An "efficient" system does not lack teachers, buildings, 
and equipment (DeRolph v. State, 1997, 741).
The 1997 DeRolph decision furthermore dictated that the state 
supreme court would retain jurisdiction over the case's final 
resolution. Ohio plaintiffs were supported by this dictation. In 
other states, when supreme court justices declared school funding 
systems unconstitutional, they did not retain oversight. Lack of ju-
dicial oversight was one explanation for why school finance reforms 
waned (Walter and Sweetland 2003).
Although three other DeRolph decisions followed the 1997 Ohio 
Supreme Court decision, the 2003 DeRolph decision stipulated that 
the high court no longer retained jurisdiction over the case's final 
resolution and outcomes (Maxwell and Sweetland 2004). For plain-
tiffs, the good news was that Ohio's school funding system was, 
as reiterated by the court, unconstitutional. The bad news was that, 
barring judicial oversight, perceived gains in winning an unconstitu-
tional ruling could result in null financial outcomes.
Throughout the same period of time, entrepreneurial activities in 
education were supported. For example, a charter school program 
was authorized in 1997; that program’s enrollment climbed to ap-
proximately 94,000 by 2010, more than 5% of statewide enrollment 
(Ohio Department of Education 2010a). The blatant irony was that 
entrepreneurial schooling was funded while traditional schooling 
was underfunded.
Recessionary Impact
Throughout litigated reforms, the economy was expressing typi-
cal ups and downs. Economic expansions made possible greater 
amounts of funding for schools. Economic contractions foreclosed 
additional funding and threatened already established school fund-
ing. The reality was that without substantial increases in state tax 
receipts, school finance reform would stall. Table 1 presents major 
tax receipts for the state of Ohio, 1997 2003.
As revealed in Table 1, the rate of change in tax collections was 
positive and substantial during the first four years of DeRolph deci-
sions. The next three years, however, as the Ohio Supreme Court 
was attempting to finalize DeRolph proceedings, the overall rate of 
change in tax collections became stagnant. The state simply did not 
have additional money to put into the school funding system. This 
economic reality should have impacted entrepreneurial activities in 
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education as well as traditional schooling. Nonetheless entrepre-
neurial activities expanded.
Meanwhile, Ohio law required that public school districts 
calculate and report five-year financial projections. The projections 
included total revenue and other financing sources, and total expen-
diture and other financing uses to illustrate the financial position of 
each district. The projections were used to forecast potential school 
district deficits and to guide the adjustment of spending patterns 
as well as the pursuit of additional revenues. The Ohio Department 
of Education analyzed five-year forecasts to determine whether a 
district was likely to encounter a deficit during a three-year period. 
Table 2 presents school district projected deficits, 2002-2004.
The growth in the number of school districts that were projected 
to incur deficits was alarming, with 2002 as the year when state tax 
collections were most impacted by recession. As revealed in Table 
2, the percentage of school districts that were projected to incur 
deficit financial positions more than doubled in just two years. The 
magnitude of this doubling was immense as well, impacting more 
than one in four public school districts in Ohio. Given the historical 
pattern of state tax collections, it was more than likely that the af-
fected districts’ administrators would need to ask voters to approve 
additional school tax levies. Asking voters for more money was 
particularly daunting during a recessionary period. Also, the task 
Table 1
Major Tax Receipts for the State of Ohio, 1997-2003
Type of Tax
Tax Receipts by Year (in millions of dollars)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Income 6,018.5 6,946.2 7,173.8 8,084.6 8,119.3 8,157.1 8,256.5
Sales 5,223.0 5,535.1 5,827.4 6,214.0 6,237.1 6,435.0 6,701.4
Corporate 1,220.3 1,268.7 1,150.3 1,029.9 973.0 774.4 808.3
Utility 672.9 708.0 670.6 675.3 674.3 300.0 255.5
Total 13,134.7 14,458.0 14,822.1 16,003.8 16,003.7 15,666.5 16,021.7
Change (%) 10% 3% 8% 0% -2% 2%
Source: Ohio Department of Taxation (2003).
Table 2
School District Projected Deficits, 2002-2004
Projected Deficits
Number of Districts by Year
2002 2003 2004
Deficit in Current Year 9 21 35
Deficit in Second Year 14 27 50
Deficit in Third Year 50 69 78
Total Deficit Forecast 73 117 163
Proportion of All Districts (%) 12% 19% 27%
Cumulative Change Rate (%) 60% 123%
Source: Ohio Department of Education, 2003.
would be an uphill battle because many citizens had been led to 
believe that the school funding system was fixed.
The alternative to raising local tax revenues was for the 27% 
of Ohio's school districts that forecasted deficits to cut school 
programs and services. This action would have directly countered 
stepped-up academic requirements that coincided with the DeRolph 
litigation as well as the federal No Child Left Behind Act require-
ments. Academic gains would have been jeopardized, and new 
standards of achievement would have been doomed. Moreover, 
if pre-DeRolph patterns of educational investment continued to 
hold true, then the school districts that would have been forced 
to embark on educational program reductions would have been 
those districts most in need of their current, and perhaps expanded, 
educational programs.
It is interesting to note that throughout 1997 to 2004, state  
foundation funding increased; that is, the nominal foundation 
amount increased. Unfortunately, foundation funding in Ohio 
suffered technical flaws. The most infamous technical flaw in-
volved the foundation program "charge-off." The charge-off was 
the amount of the foundation program that each school district 
was responsible for funding locally. Set at 23 mills of the local tax 
base, the charge-off facilitated fiscal equalization in that wealthier 
school districts ended up being responsible for greater propor-
tions of their foundation funding. This arrangement appeared to 
be reasonable until valuation and taxation aspects of the local tax 
base were considered. For example, as property valuations increased 
statewide, the charge-off calculus at the state level captured 23 
mills of the increase. In many instances, however, the local level 
of taxation did not capture additional revenue owing to the same 
increase in tax base. Property tax limitations prevented some local 
tax revenues from increasing automatically when tax base property 
valuations increased. Because the state calculus operated as though 
local revenues automatically rose, the technical effect was dubbed 
"phantom revenue." Many school district administrators complained 
that they could only capture this revenue by asking local voters to 
approve new school tax levies.
Phantom revenue and other technical flaws in Ohio's school 
funding system were associated with lever and pulley effects. Those 
effects occurred among the foundation program funding amount, 
the foundation program charge-off, and property tax limitation  
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operands. Yet another systemic flaw involved charge-off shift. This 
technical flaw occurred when property valuations increased at a 
greater rate than foundation program funding. The net result was a 
shift in fiscal burden from state to local tax bases, owing specifically 
to the foundation program charge-off. Table 3 presents a hypotheti-
cal illustration of charge-off shift.
As revealed by Table 3, charge-off shift occurred when local 
property valuations increased by 6% while the foundation amount 
increased by 3%. When legislated increases in foundation funding 
were modest, the state inadvertently leveraged its commitment to 
school funding against the local property tax base. As illustrated 
by example, the local property valuation increase ($6,600) was 
sufficient to generate the full foundation amount increase ($150) as 
well as additional funds that actually replaced a very small amount 
of base year state funding (-$2). Charge-off shift increased the local 
tax burden by $152; that is, the full amount of the increase in state 
foundation program funding for the period as well as a portion of 
the state's historical commitment to school funding. School district 
administrators once again found themselves fighting an uphill battle.
In summary, traditional schooling was promised relief. That relief 
was symbolized by extensive litigation that resulted in a unconstitu-
tional state supreme court ruling that the system of funding schools 
in Ohio failed to meet the thorough and efficient clause of the state 
constitution. The major problem was that the economy faltered 
and state coffers were stretched thin. Associated problems were 
technical flaws in the funding formula that were not fixed. School 
administrators suffered uncertainty and projected deficits.
Entrepreneurial Schooling
While funding for traditional schooling stalled, entrepreneurial 
schooling, i.e., schooling outside traditional public schools, expand-
ed. Such alternatives in Ohio included vouchers, charter schools, 
Internet schools, and home schooling.
Vouchers
While adequate funding for traditional schooling was pursued, 
the economy turned downward, and the availability of funding 
diminished. One might have then expected entrepreneurial school-
ing to suffer funding reductions as well. The opposite outcome 
occurred. Even though there was not enough funding available for 
traditional schooling, entrepreneurial schooling expanded. Propo-
nents of vouchers were early beneficiaries of the entrepreneurial 
schooling movement. Ohio’s school voucher program, as well as its 
development, has been described by Sweetland (2000a; 2002b). The 
Ohio voucher program was established in 1995. This program was 
one of the contemporary, but early voucher “experiments,” and was 
Table 3
Hypothetical Illustration of Charge-Off Shift
Base Year per Pupil Growth Rate Next Year per Pupil Change per Pupil
Foundation Amount $5,000 3% $5,150 $150
Charge-Off Millage 23 23
Local Property Valuation $110,000 6% $116,600 $6,600
Local Tax Burden $2,530 $2,682 $152
State Funding $2,470 $2,682 -$2
initially limited to the city of Cleveland. By fiscal year 2000, total 
authorized enrollment in the voucher program was 4,000 school-
children. The cost to taxpayers was originally $2,250 per pupil, 
but later the cost grew to $3,450 (Ohio Department of Education 
2010b). The measured cost to the public school district was zero. 
The voucher program was named “The Cleveland Scholarship and 
Tutoring Grant Program.” By 2009, there were 5,388 students and 
39 schools participating in the program (Ohio Department of Educa-
tion 2009).
Since the advent of the Cleveland voucher program, other 
voucher programs were created across Ohio. Litigation ensued and, 
together with political persuasion, the expansion of Ohio vouchers 
was dampened temporarily. Eventually, however, a new voucher 
program was developed. The Educational Choice Scholarship Pilot 
Program was established for fiscal year 2007 to accommodate 
14,000 schoolchildren. Under this voucher program arrangement, 
families from low performing schools statewide were permitted 
to apply for vouchers to attend private schools. Eighty-one public 
schools were impacted as of August 15th, 2007. The new voucher 
amounts were $4,250 for grades K-8 and $5,000 for grades 9-12 
(Ohio Department of Education 2006a). As of October 2009, there 
were 11,722 students enrolled in the voucher program (Ohio Depart-
ment of Education 2009). By 2011, the program was still limited 
to 14,000 students statewide, and the funding remained the same 
(Ohio Department of Education 2010c).
Charter Schools
Charter schools in Ohio were conceptualized as “community 
schools.” Funding for community schools consisted of the foun-
dation amount plus other adjustments that were awarded to the 
public school district of pupil residence. This funding flowed to the 
community schools. The Ohio Department of Education (2006b) 
described Ohio’s community schools as public, nonsectarian units 
that operated independently from traditional public school districts.
Community schools were authorized in 1997, the same year that 
the DeRolph decision was rendered. Fiscal year 1999 marked the ini-
tial implementation of Ohio’s community schools program. During 
that year, the program had 15 schools that served 2,245 children. 
Table 4 presents community schools and enrollment, 1999-2010.
Since inception, the number of community schools has grown to 
323 and the number of children served by community schools to 
94,269. Growth rates from 2001 through 2006 were phenomenal. 
The number of community schools grew at a rate exceeding 36%, 
or more than 42 schools per year. Community school enrollment 
was growing at an annualized rate that exceeded 43%, or more  
than 10,548 students per year. By 2010, growth in the number of  
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Table 4















2000 48 33 220% 9,032 6,787 302%
2001 68 20 42% 16,717 7,685 85%
2002 93 25 37% 23,628 6,911 41%
2003 133 40 43% 33,978 10,350 44%
2004 179 46 35% 46,938 12,960 38%
2005 266 87 49% 62,603 15,665 33%
2006 297 31 12% 72,318 9,715 16%
2007 313 16 5% 77,094 4,776 7%
2008 326 13 4% 82,868 5,774 7%
2009 332 6 2% 88,757 5,889 7%
2010 323 -9 -3% 94,269 5,512 6%
Sources: Jewell (2006); Ohio Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2011); Ohio Department of Education (2010a).
community schools slowed and actually became negative. The 
number of children served, however, continued to grow substan-
tially.
Conclusion
While comprehensive public information about entrepreneurial 
schooling as well as data required for educated analysis were dif-
ficult to obtain, the pattern of policy administration was clear.  
Entrepreneurial, private-sector-centered activities such as voucher 
programs and charter schools expanded. At least in the case 
of charter schools, public funding that once went to traditional 
public schools was transferred directly to nontraditional, alterna-
tive schools. Meanwhile, growth in school funding resources for 
traditional public schools slowed substantially.
The old system was characterized by an inadequate school 
foundation program and dilapidated school facilities (Moyers 1996; 
Sweetland 2000b). Litigation promulgated remedies to increase 
foundation and facilities funding (Sweetland 2002a). Funding in 
both categories progressed substantially for roughly five years. 
Then, foundation funding stagnated in 2003-2004, and facilities 
funding slowed in 2005-2006. A new system emerged, cautiously 
maintaining traditional public schools while increasingly encourag-
ing alternatives like vouchers and charter schools. A dual system of 
providing government sanctioned schooling was created.
On the surface, these changes seemed positive and progres-
sive. Traditional schooling received the benefit of examination 
and improvement. The system of funding public schools officially 
adopted a methodology of adequacy that would eventually lead to 
resources for adequate student achievement. Entrepreneurial school-
ing was allowed, and its existence promised to provide new insights 
about education, organization, and achievement. The duality of the 
system made sense. The dual system did however espouse a major 
shortcoming: Lack of funding.
School district administrators were led to believe that their 
schools would receive more funding. That funding was provided 
for a while but then diminished. Entrepreneurial schooling may not 
have initially taken money away from school districts. Inevitably, 
though, entrepreneurial schooling would compete with traditional 
schooling for funding through the state budgeting process. Perhaps 
most overlooked were indirect costs to public school districts, e.g., 
costs associated with school administrators having to explain pub-
licly what entrepreneurial schooling was available in the community. 
Moreover, there were direct costs associated with school districts 
having to compete with entrepreneurial schooling. In order to com-
pete effectively, should school districts reallocate public funds to 
pay for marketing departments, salespeople, and advertising?
The unmeasured costs of entrepreneurial schooling that burdened 
traditional schooling were considerable. Many school districts also 
incurred direct costs such as transfer payments when children 
enrolled in entrepreneurial programs. By and large, these costs were 
not recognized, let alone reimbursed. School districts already faced 
an uphill battle to fight for funding new regulations and standards. 
Entrepreneurial schooling created an additional financial burden 
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